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Les droits humains 
The Need for a Common Perception 
of Human Rights in a World of 
Diversity : A Canadian Perspective 
Ed RATUSHNY * 
La force juridique et morale des instruments relatifs aux droits de 
l'homme dépend en grande partie d'un consensus quant à la signification de 
ces droits. Sur le plan international, ce consensus est des plus difficiles à 
réaliser en raison des différences idéologiques, économiques, culturelles et 
religieuses. Peut-on dans un tel contexte concevoir que les droits de l'homme 
véhiculent des valeurs universelles ? 
Au niveau du droit interne, la classification des droits de l'homme et le 
degré de protection accordée à chaque catégorie de droits, individuels, 
collectifs, économiques et sociaux, traduit la nécessité de tenir compte de 
réalités concrètes spécifiques. 
L'auteur examine l'approche canadienne des droits de l'homme et les 
grandes étapes ayant marqué la reconnaissance de ces droits avant qu'ils ne 
soient consacrés const itutionnellement. Enfin, l'auteur situe les grandes 
catégories de droits humains dans le contexte canadien et porte un jugement 
de valeur quant au degré de protection qui leur est respectivement accordée. 
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Introduction 
In spite of the existence of international declarations and covenants on 
human rights, the problem of their definition persists. For example, in a 
recent article, B.G. Ramcharan of the United Nations Centre for Human 
Rights raised the following controversial questions : 
Do human rights pertain solely to individuals ? May they appertain to groups or 
to peoples as well? 
Do human rights embrace only traditional civil and political rights or do they 
also embrace economic, social and cultural rights? 
Do newly asserted rights, such as the right to development, exist? 
Are they capable of existing as human rights, and, if so, again, would they 
appertain to individuals only, to groups, to peoples or to a combination of 
these?1 
The author concludes that the recognition of human rights is essentially a 
normative process requiring recognition by a competent organ. Nevertheless, 
there is an evolution in the stock, of human rights : 
It is fallacious to confine the definition of human rights only to traditional 
categories or criteria. There are ongoing processes of discovery recognition; 
enlargement, enrichment and refining; and adapting and updating.2 
At the same time, the legal and moral force of laws and legal principles will be 
diminished if they can mean completely different things to different people 
and, in the international sphere, to different countries. The integrity of 
international structures for the promotion of human rights, therefore, 
requires a common perception of the meaning of human rights. 
How can this be achieved in a world of ideological, economic, cultural 
and religious diversity? People from lesser developed nations have often 
stated that traditional civil and political rights have no significance in the face 
1. " I he Concept ol Human Rights in Contemporary International Law", (1983) I Can. H.R. 
Yearbook 2d7, al 26X. 
2. //./</., at 2X0. 
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of starvation or dominance by outside forces. Often members of ethnic 
minorities and indigenous peoples see their hopes and aspirations as being 
more crucially dependent upon the vitality of the collectivity to which they 
belong than to their civil and political "freedom" as individuals. These are 
fundamental concerns which must be recognized in any discussion of human 
rights. 
However, in my view, it is regrettable that too often discussions in this 
area become a debate on the relative merits of individual rights versus 
collective or peoples' rights. Such an approach leads to the separation of 
rights into water-tight compartments and forces people to choose to support 
one category in favour of another. Geographical distinctions are often 
emphasized and the discussion may become a debate of social, economic and 
political ideology. 
Such an approach is unfortunate because the concept of human rights 
should transcend such ideology. Human rights should represent a core of 
fundamental and universal human values which every political ideology 
should respect, protect and foster. All human rights have as their foundation 
the "inherent dignity" of all persons. This central phrase is embedded in the 
first line of the Preamble to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. All 
human rights can be viewed as no more but, of course, no less, than the basic 
requirements for ensuring the preservation and enhancement of the human 
dignity of all persons3. 
If this approach is accepted, how can it be argued that one category of 
rights is more important than another? Indeed, how can there be any 
justification for maintaining classifications at all ? The real goal should be the 
implementation of human rights while over-emphasis upon classification can 
become a tedious and sterile exercise. On the other hand, there is a need for a 
clear understanding of what different human rights encompass in order to 
address specifically the manner in which their protection and promotion 
might be achieved. 
One reason for classifying human rights is the variety of contexts in 
which they must be considered. The intrinsic validity of a human right does 
not change. However, the manner and degree to which human dignity is most 
seriously offended will vary from one society to another. In Canada, for 
example, the most serious violation of human dignity may be the collective 
situation of the aboriginal peoples. Greater emphasis must be placed upon the 
amelioration of this situation. However, in doing so, care must also be taken 
.V Sec, generally, I he discussion by Schacler, "Human Dignity as a Normative Concept", 
(ISM) 11 Am. ./. Im. I.. I. 
490 Les Cahiers de Droit (1987) 28 C. de D. Ail 
not to jeopardize the rights of others, such as women. These different interests 
should not be seen as being mutually exclusive. Rather, the importance of 
both must be recognized and an appropriate balance reached depending on 
the context. A variety of historical, social, cultural and economic 
considerations may come into play in determining not only how human 
dignity may be most seriously offended, but also the manner in which it can 
best be preserved and enhanced. 
This leads to a second justification of discussing categories of human 
rights. Such classification can suggest the kinds of approaches which will be 
most functional in the promotion of human rights. Different societal 
responses may be necessary for different categories of rights. 
If I am correct in suggesting that it is desirable to examine human rights 
in a concrete context with the goal of seeking their greater protection and 
enhancement, it may be useful for us to examine these issues from a Canadian 
perspective. Let me warn you beforehand that the categories which I suggest 
do not fit neatly into existing international documents. However, they do 
emerge from the Canadian reality. 1 suspect that the same may be said of the 
experience of some other countries as well. 
1 propose briefly to canvass the Canadian approach to human rights with 
a view to illustrating both the contextual and the functional implications of 
our experience. Since this is an International Conference and the papers will 
be diffused abroad, 1 have included some factual information and 
references which may be of rather elementary familiarity to Canadian 
scholars but of considerable interest to others. 
There are two broad themes. The first is that there has been a progressive 
development in our history of tending to deal with human rights issues first in 
a political context, then in a legal context and finally on the level of 
constitutional principles. The second is that societal recognition of collective 
rights has been extremely important to the creation, as well as to the evolving 
maturity, of Canada as a nation. In fact, close scrutiny of the entire Canadian 
experience and actual practice renders it difficult to suggest that any category 
of human rights has prevailed over another. Finally, an attempt is made to 
give meaning to the concept of "Peoples' Rights" from a Canadian 
perspective but with a view to finding common ground with those in other 
parts of the world who have been more preoccupied with this concept than 
Canadians. 
1. Individual Rights in Canada 
The approach to individual rights in Canada largely derives from our 
adoption of a constitutional system similar in principle to that of the United 
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Kingdom. The essential features of such a system for the protection of 
individual rights involved a Parliamentary system of government and the 
Rule of Law including an independent judiciary. 
Thus our basic constitutional document on achieving nationhood in 
1867 contained no charter of the civil or political rights of individuals4. 
Perhaps the most relevant protection in relation to legal rights was a 
provision in our Criminal Code which specifically incorporated "Every rule 
and principle of the common Law" of England which established 
justifications or defences to criminal charges5. It may be notable that both 
before and after the constitutional adoption of the British tradition, Canada 
avoided the influence of the American and French documents of the 
Eighteenth Century in spite of both geographical proximity to the United 
States and considerable linguistic affinity with France. 
It was not until almost one hundred years after nationhood, in 1960, that 
the Government of Canada formally recognized individual rights in the form 
of the Canadian Bill of Rights6. However, this document was a statute of the 
federal Parliament, not binding upon the provinces in areas of their legislative 
jurisdiction. Moreover, it was not treated as a fundamental constitutional 
document by the courts and, therefore, was largely ineffective as a basis for 
challenging other legislation. It was less than four years ago, on April 17, 
1982, that the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms1 came into force, 
finally entrenching individual rights in our Constitution. 
Individual human rights were largely respected in practice in Canada 
through a variety of specific laws such as those related to criminal procedure 
and through the application of common law principles. The essential 
safeguards in our experience were : 1) a system of government responsible to 
the people through Parliament ; and 2) an independent judiciary. Nevertheless, 
it was only recently that individual human rights, as such, received legal and 
then constitutional recognition in Canada. 
However, individual rights were never considered to be absolute in 
Canada and many judicial decisions in our history are deferential to state 
authority. Nor have these safeguards always been effective. For example, the 
internment and confiscation of the property of Japanese Canadians during 
the Second World War was recently recognized formally by the Canadian 
4. British Sortit America Ad, 1X67. 30-31 viel., c. 3 (U.K.). 
5. R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34, s. 7. 
d. R.S.C 1970, c. B-l I. However, the Province of Saskatchewan enacted the first such slalute : 
Saskatchewan Hill of Mollis S.S. 1947, c. 35. 
7. Constitution Act. 19X2. 
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Government as a violation of human rights. Similarly, in retrospect, the 
invocation of the War Measures Act8 in 1970 is considered by many to have 
been an over-reaction. 
Perhaps the greatest threat to individual rights is in the coercive powers 
of the state and its institutions. Protection against such threats, therefore, 
requires some mechanism independent of the state to inhibit arbitrary 
encroachments upon human dignity. The function of such a mechanism is not 
proactive but responsive. It is available to be invoked when an encroachment 
occurs, but its prophylactic effect is soon lost if it does not have authoritative 
power to impose punishment or remedies for abuses. The Canadian judiciary 
has been reasonably effective in this respect. However, in Canada, the most 
serious shortcoming of this traditional approach to individual rights is its 
limited effectiveness in responding to the rights of certain collectivities. 
2. Collective Rights in Canada 
The term "collective rights" is not used here to describe the rights of all of 
those present within a state. Rather, it is used to identify a group of 
individuals within a state who share common needs as a group which are 
essential to the inherent dignity of those individuals. They may also be 
described as "group rights". As applied to aboriginal peoples they might be 
described as peoples' rights. 
Such rights may be distinguished from individual rights in the following 
way. Individual rights are largely protected when individuals are simply left 
alone to participate in society in the same manner as everyone else. Collective 
rights may require more. If simply left alone, the collectivity will be 
submerged by the larger society. Therefore, the state must take special steps 
to recognize the special human rights of the collectivity. It is only after special 
constitutional or legislative provisions have been enacted that mechanisms 
such as the courts can be invoked for protection of these rights. However, 
even with such provisions, a proactive governmental response may be 
necessary to ensure that collective rights are fully protected. Special 
governmental departments, programs or agencies may be appropriate. 
Our constitutional document of 1867, specifically recognized certain 
collective rights. Section 93 preserved existing rights and privileges in 
relation to some religious denominational schools. Section 133 established 
the equality of the English and French languages in parliamentary and the 
Québec legislative assemblies and in court proceedings. These provisions can 
X. k .S.C". 147(1, c. W-2 . 
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be seen as reflecting the concern of a French Canadian collectivity about 
losing its religious and linguistic heritage. The federal structure itself with the 
French Canadian population forming a majority in the province of Québec, 
was a form of protection for the rights of this collectivity. It is notable that the 
human rights of another significant collectivity, the indigenous peoples of 
Canada received no recognition at this time9. 
The cultural, linguistic and political rights of French Canadians did not 
diminish as a controversial issue in Canadian society over the decades 
following Confederation in 1867. The controversy ultimately led to the 
"October Crisis" of 1970, the murder of a Québec Cabinet Minister and the 
invocation of a state of emergency. In 1976, the separatist parti québécois, 
formed the Government of Québec and in 1980 it held a referendum to 
determine whether Quebecers were in favour of negotiating a new political-
economic relationship with the rest of Canada. The referendum proposal was 
rejected. 
Nevertheless, during this period, a very clear need was demonstrated for 
the federal Government to respond to the fears, aspirations and basic human 
rights of French Canadians throughout Canada. Such a response included a 
massive affirmative action program for the increased representation of 
French Canadians at all levels of federal institutions as well as the legislative 
establishment of both French and English as official languages of the federal 
Government. The official languages of Canada were subsequently entrenched 
in our Charter, not only at the Federal level but also for the province of New 
Brunswick and for the Yukon and Northwest Territories. In addition, 
minority language educational rights were constitutionally entrenched for 
both French and English in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms in 
1982. 
In contrast, apart from pre-Confederation documents, the collective 
rights of Canada's indigenous peoples were recognized only very recently 
with their organization in the early 1960's as a political force l0. In Canada, 
the term "aboriginal" is used to describe our indigenous population which is 
composed of the Indian, Inuit and Métis. The chronic unemployment, under-
employment and economic deprivation of the Native people date from the 
turn of the century, when the sometimes unlawful process of banishing many 
of them to ghetto-like reservations was completed and Native people came 
y. Apart lroni assigning legislative responsibility lor Indians specifically to the Federal 
Government by s. 91(24) of the British North America Act, IH67, supra, note 4, No other 
"people" were singled out in this manner. 
10. Although certain legal rights were recognized by some earlier statutes such as the Manitoba 
Ad IH70, R.S.C., App. Il, N"8. 
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under the jurisdiction of the Indian Act ". Disease, alcohol, separation of 
children from their families for schooling and the abolition of cultural 
practices such as the potlatch led to demoralization. 
In 1969, the federal Government issued a White Paper outlining a policy 
of repealing the Indian Act, the phasing-out of the reserve system and, 
essentially seeking the integration of Native people into the "mainstream" of 
Canadian society. The policy reflected a goal of enhancing individual rights, 
but with potentially disastrous effects for the aboriginal collectivity. Protests 
from the Indians, Métis and lnuit, persuaded the government to withdraw the 
policy in 1971. 
Not long afterwards, the Supreme Court of Canada denied a claim by the 
Nishga Indians for aboriginal title to their traditional homelands but, in 
doing so, established that aboriginal title was a legally enforceable right in 
certain circumstances l2. The federal Government also reversed its policy in 
this respect and began to negotiate the settlement of claims to aboriginal 
rights. 
Today the Canadian Charier of Rights and Freedoms specifically 
recognizes and affirms "the existing aboriginal and treaty" u rights of the 
Indian, lnuit and Métis peoples of Canada. While agreement on the precise 
scope and content of these rights could not be reached, a process is in place for 
that purpose. After decades of neglect, it may not be surprising that some time 
will be required to reach an acceptable definition. What is significant is that 
the Government recognized an injustice and first sought to respond by 
seeking greater equality for individuals. When that response was rejected, 
because it did not address the collective human rights of aboriginal peoples, a 
more appropriate approach was taken which resulted in constitutional 
recognition of the aboriginal collectivity. 
A crucial component of the current process is the direct participation of 
aboriginal peoples, themselves, in the formulation of the constitutional 
protections which will ultimately affect their destiny. It is, of course, 
becoming increasingly recognized that the participation of all persons in 
economic and political decision-making is essential to the full realization of 
economic, social and cultural rights. 
The ethnic composition of Canada has changed dramatically since 1867. 
Subsequent waves of immigration from almost every part of the world 
13. Section 35, Section 25 also provides (hut the Charier guarantees are not to be construed so 
as lo abrogate or derogate li'om aboriginal rights. 
I I. R.S.C. 1470, e. l-fi. 
12. Caliler v. A-O.U.C., [1973] S.C.R. 313. 
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formed a potent "Third Force" to balance the contervailing interests of the 
Anglo-Saxons and French Canadians. While not in a position to claim 
specific linguistic or educational guarantees, it did gain recognition of the 
multicultural reality of our country. This grouping of a variety of minorities 
who had immigrated to Canada over the last century, came to be recognized 
as forming a third collectivity in addition to the French Canadians and the 
aboriginal peoples. A separate Cabinet portfolio was created and, in 1975, the 
Minister of Multiculturalism began to shift attention from an emphasis on 
language and culture to group understanding. Section 27 of the Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms now provides that it shall be interpreted in a 
manner "consistent with the preservation and enhancement of the 
multicultural heritage of Canadians". 
3. Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in Canada 
In Canada, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights are viewed primarily 
as reflecting the obligations of the government of a state to all of the people 
within that state. Among others, these would include the development, 
deployment and distribution of the resources of the state in an equitable 
manner. Again, the basic objective of permitting all persons to live with 
human dignity does not change. However, it is perhaps with this category that 
both the context and the functional approach towards achieving the goal 
become most significant. 
In Canada there exist universal legislative programs for public 
education, unemployment insurance, medical treatment and hospitalization, 
old-age pensions, family allowances and others. These were all achieved 
through political and legislative rather than judicial processes and, perhaps as 
a result, Canadians tend not to speak of them in terms of "human rights". 
They are not included in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms l4. 
This may be viewed as ironical in light of Canada's ratification of the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Political Rights as well as 
several Conventions of the International Labour Organization. Canada has 
also played an active role in institutions such as the l.L.O. and the U.N. 
Human Rights Commission. 
Nevertheless, the adoption of some of this domestic legislation evoked 
the kind of ideological rhetoric which was alluded to earlier. For example, the 
first socialist government in Canada, in the province of Saskatchewan, was 
14. Apart from section 6 relating to "mobility rights" or the right to move from province to 
province "to pursue the gaining of a livelihood". 
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also the first to introduce a comprehensive medical care program. A fierce 
political battle ensued in which many medical doctors claimed that their 
compulsory participation in such a plan infringed upon their livelihood rights 
to be free to sell their services at a price which they would determine. The 
government saw its responsibility as providing accessible and affordable 
medicare to all citizens. A number of doctors moved out of the province and 
some moved out of the country. However, the program was established and 
eventually adopted throughout Canada. 
While there is no constitutional guarantee of medical treatment, it is 
difficult to conceive how any government in Canada could now eliminate the 
system. It has probably gained the status of a fundamental feature of our 
society. A recent example along the same lines involved an attempt by the 
current federal Government to cut back on the program of old age pensions. 
There was a political outcry including public protests and the Prime Minister 
soon reversed the Government's position. 
In my view, many of these programs have already reached the stage in 
public recognition where they constitute basic human rights in Canada even 
though they tend not to be described as such. It is simply a matter of time 
before they achieve formal constitutional recognition. 
I fully recognize that the examples which 1 have provided may not 
constitute the areas of highest concern for some societies. It is important to 
recognize that the state of implementation of this category of rights is bound 
to vary more greatly because it is so directly dependent upon the resources 
available to the state in question. Article 2 of the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights speaks of each State Party "taking 
steps", "to the maximum of its available resources", "to achieving 
progressively" the full realization of these rights. Thus the importance of 
context is specifically recognized in the Covenant, itself. 
While, in my analysis, the prime mechanism for achieving these rights is 
through the direct action of the state, the context of limited resources may 
make achievement of an acceptable level of progress impossible. Nevertheless, 
that situation should not be used to justify the derogation of other rights 
which are unrelated. Nor should it relieve a state of the obligation for the 
equitable development, deployment and distribution of those resources 
which are available. 1 believe that this obligation is not only implicit but also 
explicit in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights. 
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4. Peoples' Rights 
The notion of Peoples' Rights as a separate category of human rights has 
not been prominent from a Canadian perspective. As with Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights, it finds no expression in our constitution l5 or laws or 
even in our normal vocabulary. Nevertheless, if the same analysis (of actual 
practice rather than form) is applied to this category as to the previous one, it 
is possible to discern an emerging concept of international obligation which 
can be linked to a corresponding human right. 
1 began by suggesting that all human rights are related to the basic 
concept of the human dignity of every person. The context may vary, 
requiring emphasis upon one category of rights rather than another in order 
to achieve that basic goal. However, the concept itself is indivisible and 
universal. 
If that is the case, then the objective of protecting and enhancing human 
rights cannot stop at national boundaries or regional affinities. When a state 
has acted equitably to develop, deploy and distribute the resources of that 
state, yet those resources are still inadequate to achieve a basic level of dignity 
for its citizens, those citizens must have a right to look to the international 
community for assistance in achieving the common goal which underlies all 
human rights. I believe that the obligation to provide such assistance falls 
most directly, not upon international institutions nor upon national 
governments, but upon every individual. Again, the basis ofthat obligation 
must be that if some human beings are required to live in sub-standard 
conditions of human dignity, then the human dignity of all human beings is 
diminished. As the International Labour Organization has proclaimed: 
"Poverty anywhere is a threat to prosperity everywhere." Ifl 
Indeed, new approaches to International Law depart from the more 
traditional view that only states are its subjects. It is now becoming 
increasingly evident that individuals must form a central focus for 
international human rights law. 
Of course, individual action frequently will be expressed through the 
instrument of a state government and the general obligation should be 
recognized and asserted as such by every government. Similarly, concerted 
action may be undertaken through international institutions. However, the 
source of the obligation is in sharing a common humanity and, in some 
15. Apart from Section 35 of the Charter which refers to the rights of the "aboriginal peoples of 
Canada". It has already been suggested that this falls within the category of a "collective" 
right. 
Id. Decluralitin of I'hikulvlphia. 1944, and now embodied in the ILO Constitution. 
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situations, the most effective assistance may occur through non-governmental 
organizations. 
I n Canada, there appears to be a growing recognition of this obligation 
of citizens to share the responsibility for the protection of human rights 
beyond our borders. Non-governmental organizations such as the Canadian 
Section of Amnesty International, Oxfam and church organizations are 
receiving increasing public support for their efforts to help less fortunate 
persons in other countries. The cause of peace and disarmament is highly 
respected and widely supported today. Environmental issues such as acid rain 
have given Canadians the clear message that the environment is an 
international concern that affects every individual. The present Government 
is currently reviewing aspects of Canada's foreign policy which will include its 
role in the international protection of human rights. 
Canadians have come to recognize that we live in a world in which the 
rights of all of its Peoples are inter-dependent. This growing perception can 
be viewed as a form of "solidarity" which is a natural consequence of sharing 
that common humanity. It can be manifest in sharing the responsibility of 
achieving development throughout the world, in pursuing peace and 
disarmament and in ensuring a safe and healthy environment. Of course, it is 
difficult to articulate precise standards for this category of emerging human 
rights. However, it might be appropriate here to incorporate a similar 
approach to that which is expressed in the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. That is to strive for progressive 
achievement by appropriate means based on available resources. 
This notion of solidarity cannot be restricted to any category of human 
rights. If the obligation flows from the indivisibility of human dignity then the 
obligation cannot distinguish between political, civil, collective, economic, 
social or cultural rights. The concept of solidarity must extend to every 
category and the obligation to act must relate to every form of violation. 
It is, of course, important in this context constantly to remind ourselves 
that solidarity with the peoples of the world in enhancing human dignity 
through the protection of human rights must not extend to any interference 
with the right of such peoples to determine their own destiny. Such self-
determination is also an essential aspect of human dignity. The obligation to 
assist in the achievement of human rights bears no license to undermine the 
sovereignty of any state or to attempt to establish priorities or agendas for 
others. 
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Conclusion 
There are many difficulties in attempting to classify human rights. 1 have 
not mentioned the Canadian Charter's "equality rights" provision, but it may 
be of some interest because of its breadth. It provides : 
I5( I) Every individual is equal before and under the law and has the right to 
the equal protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination and, in 
particular, without discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin, 
colour, religion. se\, age or mental or physical disability. 
This provision is expressed in terms of an individual. However, it may be 
equally effective in protecting the rights of a collectivity. Moreover, its real 
value is in ensuring access to economic, social and cultural opportunities. It, 
therefore, encompasses all of the first three categories which 1 have suggested 
and certainly has relevance for the fourth category as well. 
It was expressly recognized in the same section that an individual 
approach to problems of discrimination could not be totally effective. 
Provision was made for attacking "systemic" discrimination through 
programs of "affirmative action": 
(2) Subsection (I) does not preclude any law, program or activity that has as 
its object the amelioration of conditions of disadvantaged individuals orgroups 
including those that are disadvantaged because of race, national or ethnic 
origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability. 
Incidentally, the examples of collectivities which were given earlier all involve 
ethnic minorities. It is interesting to consider whether that is an essential 
characteristic or whether other groups such as disabled persons or elderly 
persons should also be considered to be a "collectivity". May a majority 
group which suffers discrimination, such as all of the women in a society, 
constitute a collectivity for legal purposes? 
In spite of the difficulties, categorization may serve a useful purpose in 
identifying the kinds of human rights which are most urgently in need of 
attention in a particular context. The particular category might then indicate 
the kind of response which is necessary. 
To summarize, the Canadian experience might be categorized as follows. 
(I) Individual Rights. The traditional political and civil rights were 
introduced through the British common law and have been 
constitutionally entrenched only recently. Since their greatest threat 
may be from Government and its institutions, they have been 
protected largely by the responsibility of Government to an elected 
Parliament and the availability of an authoritative and independent 
judiciary for adjudicating alleged violations. 
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(2) Collective Rights. These were recognized in our basic constitutional 
document at the time of nationhood. Over the years, political and 
legal recognition of collectivities in addition to the French 
Canadians of Québec, led to constitutional entrenchment of broader 
linguistic rights for both French and English, as well as the 
recognition of aboriginal rights and the multicultural heritage of 
Canada. With legal and constitutional recognition, these rights may 
now be pursued through the courts. However, in order to ensure the 
continued existence of collectivities, these rights have been 
supplemented bu catalytic programs of Government and its 
agencies. 
(3) Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. This category has received 
virtually no entrenched constitutional recognition as an essential 
component of basic human rights. However, a historical and current 
survey of the relevant areas, indicates a high level of both public 
expectation and of governmental response through legislation. Since 
this category essentially involves the obligation of a State to its 
inhabitants, it is through direct government programs and 
legislation that these rights are most likely to be achieved. 
Nevertheless, public recognition and government commitment are 
moving towards a time when this category might well find express 
recognition in the Canadian Charier of Rights and Freedoms. 
(4) The Rights of Peoples Beyond Canada. Evoking Canadian 
governmental policy and non-governmental initiatives by Canadians 
suggest a growing recognition of an international obligation to 
respond when the human dignity of others is threatened by the 
inability of another state to protect the economic, social and cultural 
rights of its citizens. There is also growing recognition of an equal 
obligation to respond to violations of the rights of individuals and of 
collectivities of persons beyond Canada's borders. Such an 
obligation has not been conceptualized as a human right in Canada. 
Nevertheless, one can envision a day when it not only finds 
expression in government policy and practice, but also receives 
explicit articulation as a constitutional norm reflecting a fundamental 
value of Canadian society. 
In conclusion, 1 believe it to be important that efforts be made to develop 
and crystalli/c a common perception ol the meaning to be given to the various 
categories of human rights. We must strive, together with lesser developed 
nations, to give more precise meaning to emerging new concepts of human 
rights. The variations ol context will permit different emphasis to be given but 
inherent human dignity which is at the core of all human rights must always 
be respected. 
